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overestimating human error in ex post facto analysis can 
be dangerous. 
Why do states withdraw their troops? The answer is 
based on decision makers' perceptions of changes in 
global politics, enemy composition, resource base, and 
home public support. In the end, new administrations 
had to come to power to replace the prevailing inter- 
vention strategy and get out. The message is that old 
leaders continue policy patterns, and only new ones 
may change the course. 
This study rejects the notion that policymakers are 
universally unwise, motivated by grandeur or ideology, 
or that they have distinct human limitations. In fact, 
leaders are judged neither harshly nor favorably. Pro- 
tractedness is not the result of foolishness of choice but 
murkiness of the situation. Cohen, in summarizing the 
progressive stage of interventions, argues that the mid- 
dle game is hard to evaluate for success or effectiveness. 
Assessments are muddy, and a general fog prevails, 
limiting clear understanding. 
In the end, conclude the editors, foreign military 
interventions are unpredictable, complex, destructive, 
and difficult to evaluate on a cost-benefit scale. Why? 
Because the cases chosen emphasize these factors, and 
the framework cannot screen out noise. On a broader 
note, intervention may continue to be characterized in 
this way because, as part of international relations 
conflict, political goals will continue to be advanced by 
military means, opportunities and incentives for inter- 
vention will exist, and international controls marking 
parameters of acceptable intervention will not be delin- 
eated. 
An appraisal of this book must rest on the wisdom of 
case selections and on the theoretical framework used to 
extract information and build general patterns about 
protracted military intervention. The emergence of a 
new era in international relations characterized by inten- 
sified, violent nationalist movements, poses problems 
relating to the balance between self-determination and 
sovereignty and assessments of security and stabili- 
ty-in short, serious challenges for a potential interve- 
nor. Are there guidelines for policymakers in this book? 
Do scholars have a better understanding of the process 
of intervention? 
Many questions are still unanswered, yet the book is a 
catalyst for anyone who wishes to probe the matter 
further. In these cases, for example, if protracted inter- 
ventions are costly and less than successful, we might 
want to know more about the effects of policy planning. 
Were the intervention strategies essentially random or 
clearly planned? Were they outlined in both short- and 
long-term frameworks? Did the introduction of military 
troops to solve the conflict reconfirm or invalidate poli- 
cymaker beliefs about force effectiveness? One acquires 
no real perspective on these points, in spite of the 
historical detail and conscious comparative analysis pre- 
sented. The study lacks criteria to measure intervention 
policy success and failure. What does each entail? What 
degrees of difference exist? What happens once inter- 
vening states begin to realize that they may not achieve 
their objectives? This choice is essentially one of flight or 
fight; but since military intervention in this project is 
conceived as a process composed of small steps, the 
overarching strategy is hard to unveil. Perhaps includ- 
ing some short, successful interventions as case studies 
might have sharpened the causal logic developed to 
identify involvement and disengagement decisions. Al- 
ternative design structures are often recommended over 
a chosen research strategy, but the issue here is whether 
substantial alteration in conclusions might have been the 
result. This is hard to say. 
The status of intervention as a key concept to under- 
stand contemporary world politics is rising. As a tool of 
influence, it represents overt and covert involvement by 
bigger states into the economic, social, and political 
processes of weaker countries. It is a bulwark of power 
politics. With the end of the Cold War and new domains 
of conflict eruption, sovereignty and security demands 
are unlikely to disappear from the international scene. 
Today, humanitarian and collective intervention are the 
frequently debated issues in official international circles; 
but military force is still a significant part of the action. In 
essence, this book is timely for its emphasis on military 
force and contributes to our knowledge about dangers 
behind protracted conflict involvement. This should be 
useful in the current world environment of multiple 
conflicts and attendant, ample temptations for inter- 
vention. 
University of Denver KAREN A. FESTE 
Morality and American Foreign Policy. By Robert W. 
McElroy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
194p. $24.95. 
Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy: The- 
ory and Practice. By Kenneth W. Thompson. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992. 353p. 
$37.50 cloth, $12.95 paper. 
Though the contrasts between Robert W. McElroy's 
Morality and American Foreign Policy and Kenneth W. 
Thompson's Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplo- 
macy are both real and apparent, that the contrasts 
between these two readable and knowledgeable books 
are not far greater than they are illustrates much of the 
difficulty with the state of theory in the field of interna- 
tional relations. 
McElroy's work is a dissertational effort to clarify the 
gap between the realist and "internationalist" para- 
digms in international relations as well as build a "path- 
way" between them. It is a laudable first book. Decrying 
the undoubtedly still great distance between ethics (or 
philosophy generally) and the study of international 
affairs, McElroy suggests properly if not originally that 
the consideration of morality is inexorably bound to the 
consideration if not the reality of international progress. 
There is more than a hint of purposiveness here, al- 
though unfortunately the philosophical clarion to such 
purposiveness is Immanuel Kant whose notions of the 
universalization of international norms and a kind of 
golden rule of international behavior reflect all too 
vividly the usual Kantian requirement of intersubjectiv- 
ity. It is no surprise, either within Kant or McElroy, that 
substantive unanimity imports a methodology of inter- 
state contractuality and that the search for a peaceful 
and "regular pattern of interactions," therefore, still 
lacks a convincing pathway. The dialectic, drawn from 
Kant's "law of states" and Kant's "cosmopolitan law" 
that would protect citizens within states, is categorically 
obedient to the classificatory in ways that stifle progress 
along intellectual and real world pathways. 
How, then, to break out? As McElroy far less asham- 
edly has morality a part of foreign affairs than Thomp- 
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son, McElroy places responsibility upon the individual 
actor. It is the "moral politician" (Kant again) who must 
triumph over the "political moralist," the latter given to 
expediency and the former given to such departures 
from traditional realism as a) Herbert Hoover's 1921 
Russian relief effort, b) Richard Nixon's destruction of 
America's chemical and biological weapons, and c) 
Jimmy Carter's Panama Canal Treaty. By contrast, there 
is Dresden, although here McElroy is too ready to write 
of circumstances, the slowing of the Eastward infantry 
drive in 1944, etc., than he is of the theoretical and actual 
differences between moral and amoral choices. 
In short, the weakness of McElroy's first book is not in 
its scholarship or its writing. It is in its inability to yet 
define a theory that would suggest how to propel the 
moral norm towards intellectual and international 
progress. Descriptiveness too often subverts prescrip- 
tiveness. McElroy settles for explanations of why the 
clarity of the norm-and why better rates of moral 
compliance occur when national security is less in- 
volved-predict the moral choice. There is a link be- 
tween the moral choice and the demands of someone's 
"real" world to be sure, but it is not only involved with, 
but dependent upon, the underlying linkage of interna- 
tional relations theory with both reality and the deepest 
intellectual understandings of how both morality and 
reality are known. 
With Thompson, the gap between morality and reality 
is wider still, Thompson's ambivalence about the place 
of morality in international affairs being obvious from 
the start. Substantively, this is a rich book, a bevy of 
seedbeds for moral discourse being planted in discus- 
sions of nuclear security, disarmament, human rights, 
and the conflicts over values that marked the decisions 
of Lincoln, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. 
There are attempts to sew together the morality versus 
reality threads that weave their way through the book in 
chapters on history as end point or beginning, national 
decline, and the openness of history when seen from 
any contemporary perspective. 
But Thompson's problem with perspectives, briefly 
stated, is his lack of systematic differentiation. His 
discussions of intellectual contrasts fail to deal with the 
epistemological, that is the "forms of knowledge," dif- 
ferentiations that underlie all ethical positions. Thomp- 
son's oft written-of education, the University of Chica- 
go's morally skeptical Morgenthau sharing top billing 
with the ethical admonitions of Neibuhr, apparently did 
not lead Thompson to an understanding of the role of 
epistemology in theory. Thompson properly decries the 
lack of continuity among "the seemingly endless repe- 
tition of intellectual and philosophical debates." But 
even his worthy developmental portrayal of the move- 
ment from international law, through political, to insti- 
tutional approaches within international relations stud- 
ies, does not bind the development to commensurable 
contrasts between methodological and epistemological 
approaches. As a result, the thoughtful portrayal of 
international realism never discovers the roots of the 
almost static analysis of qualitatively similar variables of 
human nature, state-to-state relationships, undifferenti- 
ated kinds of power, and the like. As a further result, the 
less thoughtful but still credible depiction of idealism 
finds the principle intellectual tension in international 
affairs to lie within the dualism of each human nature, 
not the differentiation between and among various hu- 
man natures. Even the description of Lincoln's Sanitary 
Fair speech contrast between a man's living off the 
"product of his labor" or "the product of other men's 
labors" would leave one to think the tension's options 
equally weighted. Did Lincoln think that? Does Thomp- 
son? 
What is so frustrating is that Thompson, at least at 
times, comes so close to seeing things, as they must be 
seen if theoretical advancement is to occur, from the 
intellectual top. His marvelous description of the main- 
tenance of tensions within the foreign policy of Richard 
Nixon, the best segment of the book, credits Nixon's 
own deep understanding of that tension for the success 
of the China strategy and other Nixon triumphs. But in 
Thompson's general discussion of history, his proper 
scoring of Fukuyama's wrongness about Hegel is dulled 
by his own wrongness about Hegel. Thompson's earlier 
attack on Hegel's drive for the imposition of the state on 
a population fails to recognize the primacy of the ethical 
state within Hegel's prescription. Yes, there is a deter- 
ministic rationality to Hegel, but it is an ascending, 
differentiated rationality that Hegel strives for, and 
Hegel deals with it through a dialectic of tension that is 
epistemologically distinguishable from the dialectic of 
Kant. 
Not surprisingly, Hegel is suspicious of liberalism, 
more so than Kant, but that squares with Hegel's dia- 
lectic dealings with ever more differentiated cognitive 
variables. Kant's dialectic steadfastly held to the classif- 
icatory imperative. Kant's dialectic is a dutiful first 
cousin to the Categorical Imperative that was at the 
heart of all of Kant's thinking and, not surprisingly, 
therefore, Kant saw perpetual peace as growing out of 
the contractual form that McElroy identified. Hegel's 
peace is the product of the engrossment of the ever more 
complex intellectual and ultimately real world variables 
that somehow reconcile today's reality and tomorrow's 
thrust of the historical Idea. 
Perhaps the greatest dialectic, for international rela- 
tions theory as well as for the real world of international 
relations, is the never ending conflict of Kant-like and 
Hegel-like dialectics themselves. First and foremost, 
both German idealists dealt with the core epistemologi- 
cal issues of the nature of knowledge, as well as the 
limits to knowledge. It is on their epistemological writ- 
ings, not the substantive writings on politics or peace, 
that international relations theory should be built. Kant 
did not believe in the synthetic, differentiated cognition 
beyond the most restrictive notions of mathematics, 
natural science, and personal morality. As a result, the 
human purposiveness of his vision of international 
affairs, like his vision of the improvement of knowledge, 
was overshadowed by the hand of Providence. Hegel's 
belief in the human capacity to understand ever more 
differentiated, or synthetic, qualities of knowledge, 
along with his belief in the expansion of the limits of 
knowledge and morality, was the core of his optimism. 
That Kant would reject the coming into objective con- 
sciousness of an ever-improving moral vision, and that 
Hegel would depict the dialectic as a movement of 
consciousness towards just such a vision are both un- 
derstandable and commensurable. That proponents of 
the realist and the idealist visions of international rela- 
tions would differ over the cognitive reconcilability of 
the two very different cognitive entities of reality and 
hope is also understandable and commensurable. In- 
deed, it is the essence of the contrast between the realist 
and the idealist perspectives. 
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It is this contrast, I would hope, that the later books of 
McElroy, and even Thompson, would speak to. If they 
do, the progress of understanding in international rela- 
tions will be as assured as the contrast between the 
traumas of the present world and the peacefulness of the 
world's future. 
University of South Carolina WILLIAM P. KREML 
Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political 
Realism. By Miroslav Nincic. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992. 200p. $37.50. 
In this book, Miroslav Nincic examines, explores, and 
refutes a notion promulgated by such proponents of 
classical "realism" as Hans J. Morganthau and George F. 
Kennan. The notion holds, in Nincic's words, that 
"democratic foreign policy suffers from having to accom- 
modate the sentiments of the public and its representa- 
tives, sentiments that are grounded in a combination of 
factual ignorance and emotive drives that clash with the 
tenets by which international affairs are best managed" 
(p. 152). 
In a nicely-organized and fluidly-written argument, 
Nincic focuses on the American experience to examine 
the impact of public opinion, of Congressional consid- 
eration, and of electoral politics on the development and 
conduct of foreign policy. He argues that realist argu- 
ments essentially suggest three rules: ideals should not 
be confused with interests, interests and power should 
be "brought into proper balance," and "the actual con- 
duct of foreign affairs should proceed in a measured, 
consistent fashion" (pp. 22-23). He concludes that, in 
general, democracy does quite well by these (rather 
mushy) criteria. 
Public opinion-"the mentality of the masses"-is 
really quite reasonable and coherent, he argues. While 
the average American may not be terribly well-informed 
about foreign policy, the public is not "particularly 
disorganized, unstable, or extreme regarding foreign 
affairs" (p. 45). In general, it appears to be "moderate" 
and pragmatic, and its "normative goals are actually 
quite close to the foreign policy preferences of the 
leadership groups from which policy makers are gener- 
ally drawn" (p. 52). 
He reaches a similar conclusion about Congress. Al- 
though he acknowledges that "instances of misguided 
comportment by the nation's legislators do exist," he 
concludes that "examples of considerable Congressional 
wisdom can also be found" (p. 64). And while conceding 
that electoral politics can sometimes adversely affect the 
conduct of foreign policy, he argues that there are also 
positive benefits in elections as they enhance the ex- 
change of ideas and hold political leaders accountable 
for foreign policy failures (p. 119). 
He also concludes that there has often been a ten- 
dency in American foreign policy for leaders to exagger- 
ate, for domestic political reasons, the degree to which 
there is an outside threat. In this, he may be overstating 
the case somewhat. If the threat was indeed exagger- 
ated, it seems to me that political leaders largely believed 
their own exaggerations. 
In the final chapter, Nincic wades into the decades- 
long debate-for which the classic realists bear eternal 
responsibility-about what is, after all, the "national 
interest." As he demonstrates once again, the more one 
struggles with this concept, the more one becomes 
enmeshed in muddled vapidities and "limp tautologies" 
(p. 158). 
He concedes that the concept might have some objec- 
tive validity if it is very narrowly defined as a quest for 
physical survival, economic health, and the continuance 
of the society's basic normative order (p. 161). But even 
that concession is questionable. The Soviet Union ap- 
pears recently to have peacefully decided that its na- 
tional interest lay in its own physical disintegration and 
in a radical restructuring of its basic normative order. 
Similarly, many leaders, such as the Ayatollah Khomeini 
in Iran, would consider the economic health of their 
country to be of only very secondary importance. Nincic 
concludes that, in general, "a national interest emerges 
only from an authentically democratic aggregation of 
domestic preferences" (p. 168). That may be about the 
best way to deal with the issue (apart from abandoning 
it entirely), though it is not clear why the aggregation 
has necessarily to be "democratic." 
With his intentional focus on the American case, 
Nincic specifically eschews a comparative perspective 
(p. 24). In some important respects, however, his argu- 
ment might have been strengthened with a bit of com- 
parison. That is, while he argues convincingly that 
American foreign policy has shown a fair amount of 
moderation, coherence, and wisdom, his case might be 
stronger if that experience were juxtaposed with the 
alternative. 
While democratic governments have made their share 
of foreign policy blunders, these, it might well be 
argued, pale in comparison to the foreign policy disas- 
ters non-democratic countries have experienced under 
such leaders as Hitler, Mussolini, Kim Il-Sung, 
Khomeini, Nasser, and Saddam Hussein. And one 
might also look at the quality of the people democracies 
have generally put forward to run their foreign policy, 
comparing them to the similar products of non-demo- 
cratic societies. The overall record for non-democracies, 
after all, is fairly abysmal. Rebecca West may exaggerate 
somewhat when she observes in Black Lamb and Grey 
Falcon (1941) that in 645 years of rule the Hapsburg 
family produced "no genius, only two rulers of ability 
... countless dullards, and not a few imbeciles and 
lunatics," but she is not that far off the mark. In such a 
comparison, it would seem, democracies do rather well. 
And a consideration of this sort might have served to 
enhance Nincic's basic argument. 
University of Rochester JOHN MUELLER 
From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving Ethnic 
and Regional Conflict. By Jay Rothman. Newbury 
Park: Sage, 1992. 231p. $51.00 cloth, $24.50 paper. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s several scholars of 
international relations developed conflict management 
training workshops, the purpose of which was to sup- 
port a process towards peace in the context of intractable 
conflicts. John Burton, Leonard Doob, and Herbert 
Kelman, among others, conducted "controlled commu- 
nication" or problem solving workshops with high-level 
representatives of groups involved in protracted com- 
munal disputes. John Rothman's book presents an ex- 
tension of those early action/research projects. Applying 
principles found in the conflict analysis and conflict 
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